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The R&D procurement process should be subjected t o  t h e  same in tense  
"cost versus  effect iveness"  questioning t h a t  has  been appl ied i n  recent 
years  by t he  Department of Defense t o  t h e  choice of a l t e r n a t i v e  proposed 
weapon systems. Under t h i s  cost leffect ivenesa evaluat ion approach, a l t e r -  
na t ive  means of contract ing for research and development should be examined 
f n  l i g h t  of t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  benef i t s  and cos t s  of a l l  forms. 
procurement process cont ro ls  t h e  awards of over $8 billion annually of 
government-sponsored research and development cont rac ts  t o  industry,  uni- 
v e r s i t i e s ,  end non-profit  organizations.  A broad view of t h e  process in-  
The present 
c ludes not only t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  po l i c i e s ,  and procadures t h a t  under l ie  
R6D procurement but a l s o  t h e  organizations and people, t h e i r  a t t i t u d e r ,  
and i n d i r e c t  a s  w e l l  a s  d i r ec t  e f f e c t s  of t h e  process. 




Who a r e  t h e  winners of research and development cont rac ts?  
What a r e  t h e  key determinants of t he  awards t o  these  winners? 
Compared w i t h  possible  a l t e rna t ives ,  what a r e  t h e  bene f i t s  of 
t h e  present R&D procurement process? 
Compared with poesible a l t e rna t ives ,  what a r e  the  costa  of t h e  
present R&D procurement procees? 
4. 
Answers t o  these questions w i l l  be based on t he  r e s u l t s  of th ree  years  of 
research by t h e  author on t h e  research and development procurement process. 
Who Wins R&D Awards? 
To determine t h e  cherac te r ia t ica  of,R&D award winners b r i e f  queotion- 
n a i r e s  were mailed t o  about 1100 companier s o l i c i t e d  t o  bid on one of 45 
formally-competitive M D  award8 issued by a Department of Defense con t r r c t -  
i 
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ing center. The awards were for unclassified work, each involving expend- 
itures of between $100,000 and $2 million, the contracts issued between , 
May, 1962 and June, 1964. Their selection for the sample study was designed 
to avoid bias by contract size, technology, or organization source within 
the DOD installation. Usable replies have been received on about forty 
per cent of the questionnaires, including approximately 55 per cent of 
the award winners. 1 
A t  this point in the cost/effectiveness evaluation, the questionnaire 
data will be examined to point out characteristics of the winning firms 
relative to their losing competitors. The data presentation will follow 
a time sequence starting with the environment preceeding the government's 
mailing of Requests for Proposals to industry and finishing with submission 
of the R&D proposals. 
The first historical characteristic of the active competitors for the 
awards is their prior technical experience. The questionnaires asked: 
"Had your firm performed contract work for this technical initiator (or 
his group) prior to the issuance of the R.F.P.?" As shown in Table 1 6 1  
Per cent of the kinners had this contractual background, while only 34 Per 
cent of the losers qualified in this respect, a two to one difference in 
experience of the two groups of competitors. 
had worked on more than one contract for the organization studied. 
A number of the respondents 
~~ 
'Some initial analyses of bidder-no bidder and winner-loser differences 
are included in a thesis performed by one of the author's graduate 
research assistants: Lewis G. Pringle, "An Investigation of R&D Marketing 
Strategy" (unpublished Master of Science thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School Of 
Management, 1965). 
Table 1. Pr ior  Contractual mperlence 
R i o r  NO Pr io r  Tota l  
Contract (e) Contract Re s pan s e s 
Winners 15 9 24 
Losers 26 51 77 
Of course, background contractual  experience with o ther  organizat ions 
o r  in-house independent research might a l s o  qua l i fy  the  competing organiza- 
t ions .  
data  on e f f o r t  expended "in areae of immediate technicel  relevance t o  t h e  
subjec t  procurement, p r io r  to rece ip t  of t h e  R.P.P.". 
experience outdistanced tha t  of t he  losers ,  the  average winner having had 
18.0 technica l  man-years of pr ior  e f f o r t  i n  cont ras t  with t h e  11.2 men-years 
average of the  losers ,  
For t h i s  more general  areas of inquiry the  quest ionnaires  sought 
Here too  the winners' 
Winners have apparently been i n  much c loser  contact with the  govern- 
ment technica l  group, exchanging ideas  by formal and informal means. 
two t o  one d i f fe rence  again showa up between winners and l o s e r s  i n  t h e i r  
p r i o r  submit ta l  of unsol ic i ted  proposals t o  t h e  same customer i n  t h e  same 
technica l  a rea ,  with 32 per cent of t h e  winners and 15 per cent  of t h e  lo se re  
using t h i s  approach to  technical  communication and technice l  marketing. 
A 
Table 2. Unsolicited Proposals 
P r io r  Unsolicited No Prior Tota l  
' Proposals Unsolicited Proposals Responses 
Winners I 
Losers 
8 17 25 
12 67 79 
. .  
. 
Apparently F&D competitors learn of prospective cont rac ts  of i n t e r e s t  
Even here,  however, winnerr by means o ther  than t h e  formal announcements. 
a r e  more knowledgeable than losers ,  with 7 1  per cent  an t i c ipa t ing  t h e  R I F ~ P I  
versus 53 per cent  of t he  losers .  
As soon a8 an R.F.P. is  received i t  can be read and judgments made 
about t h e  nature of the  competitive s i t ua t ion .  
a s  winners thought "the procurement appear f ig  t o  'belong' t o  someone else", 
with 24 per cent 'or  one of every four lo se r s  en ter ing  a competttton he be- 
l ieved "wired" against  him. 
Three times a s  many l o s e r s  
The response f igures  a r e  shown i n  Table 3. 
- Table 3. Procurement "Belonged" t o  Someone Else 
Procurement Procurement Total  
''Be longed" Did Not "Belongt* Responses 
Winners 2 23 25 
Losers 19 59 78 
On the  o ther  hand, four times a s  many winnera a s  l o se r s ,  36 per cent  
compared with nine per cent,  f e l t  t h e  procurement "belonged" t o  t h e i r  own 
firm. It i s  in t e re s t ing ,  i f  perhaps only coincidental ,  t h a t  e ight  per cent  
of t h e  winners and nine per cent of the  l o s e r s  were "upset" i n  t h e i r  pre- 
d i c t i o n s  of "wired procurements. Other non- s t a t i s t i ca l  evidences suggest 
t h a t  both groups may have been r igh t ,  but t h a t -  f ac to r s  a rose  during t h e  
competitions t o  reverse p r io r  government preferences. 
Winners of research and development cont rac ts  apparently had b e t t e r  
personal r e l a t ionsh ips  with government technica l  i n i t i a t o r s  than d id  lo se r s ,  
or a t  least they were more conscientious of t he  importance of personal con= 
tactr .  S l i g h t l y  pore of them knew t he  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  technica l  I n i t i a t o r  
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Knew Did Not Know 
I n i t i a t o r  I n 1  t Fa t o r  
Winners 20 5 
Table 4. Procurembnt "Belonged" t o  Own Firm 
Contacted No Contact 
I n i t i a t o r  wlth I n i t i a t o r  
12 13 
Procurement Procurement Toea 1 
"Be longed" Did Not "Belong" Responses 
Winner r 9 
b e e r s  7 
.16 25 
70 77 
of t h e  Procurement, and r e l a t i v e l y  more of t h e  winnera eetabl iehed contact  
with government technica l  perronnel a f t e r  r e c e i p t  of t h e  R.F.P. but before  
proporal eubmlttal. 
U e e r a  56 23 27 51 
'Given these ind ica t ions  i t  is not eurpr ie ing t h a t  winnere had more 
confidence i n  themaelvee ae  having an "advantage over a hypothet ical  company 
of equal technica l  competence whoee knowledge of customer requirement8 wae 
l i m i t e d  eo le ly  t o  information contained i n  t h e  R.F.P." The answers t o  t h i s  
queetlon suggest t h a t  winnere not only knew;information not contained i n  
t h e  R.F.P. but a l eo  t h a t  they regarded t h e i r  incremental knowledge a s  la- 
por tan t .  
The R&D winnere a l eo  thought t he  proepective jobe were important t o  
t h e i r  government cuetomerr and t h a t  cont rac ts  would i n  f a c t  * be awarded 
( r a t h e r  than be l o s t  i n  t h e  red tape) and r e e u l t  in r i g n i f i c a n t  follow-on. 
When asked t o  ertimsta t h e  p r i o r i t y  t h a t  t h e  cuatomer at tached t o  t h e  pro- 
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Winners 17 8 
b e e r s  26 52 
Table 6 .  Advantaged over Compktition 
7 18 
11 68 \ 
Not Tota l  
Advantaged Advantagqd Response 
Winners 16 7 23 
b e e r s  34 41 75 
curement, t h e  winners r e l a t i v e  t o  the  loeers  regarded the  procurements a s  
higher  i n  pr iooi ty ,  t he  difference i n  t h e i r  answers being highly s i g n i f i -  
cant  @.e., a t  t he  2 per cent level  of probable occurrence). 
t he  average winner'# estimate a t  t h e  t i m e  of bidding of t he  follow-on t o  
the  procurement was 20 per cent higher than the average f08er'S est imate* 
Get t ing c lose r  t o  a technica l  area of work changes a winner's viewe of i t 8  
importance, t h e  winner's current  average est imate  of follow-on being double 
h i 8  i n i t i a l  estimate,  while t he  average l o s e r ' s  es t imate  has been unchanged- 
During the  propoeal preparation phase t h e  winners of reaearch and 
development cont rac ts  a l s o  showed themselves t o  be a ign i f i cen t ly  d i f f e r e n t  
from losere .  
Furthermore, 
68 per cent of the winnere versus only 33 per cent of the  
loeere  s t a t e d  they designed the  technica l  approach of t h e i r  propoeale t o  
88 t i8 fy  known t echnica l  preferences of t he  cuetomer. Furthermore, 28 p e r -  
cen t  of t h e  winners versus 14 per cent of the  l o s e r s  d i rec ted  t h e  content 
of t h e i r  proposal8 toward pa r t i cu la r  Bndividuals i n  t h e  government agency. 
Table 7 .  kbp08a l  Reflected Preferences of and Directed t o  Customer 
Reflected D i d  Not 
Prafercncer Prefer ences 
Customer . RefXect Cuetomer 
Directed a t  Not Directed 
Pa r t i cu la r  a t  P a r t i c u l a r  
Ind iv idua ls  Indiv idua ls  I 
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There data support t h e  notion t h a t  h i s  more extensive p r i o r  contac ts  a r e  
c r u c i a l  to  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of t he  winner from the  loser. 
The f i n a l  d i r t inguish ing  cha rec t e r i s t i c  of the  R&D winner i s  t h a t  he  
doer not pay a r  much a t t en t ion  a s  do l o s e r s  t o  the  formal a rpec te  of pro- 
posal preparation. A recent rtudy by Thomas J. Allen of t h e  H.I.T. Sloan 
School of Management revealed tha t  i n  22 U D  proposal competitions, t he  
company t h a t  received t h e  highest  t echnice l  evaluat ion (and urue1ly won 
t h e  contract)  had invested on the  average l ees  technica l  man-hours i n  t h e  
formal proposal than did the  next four highest  ranking contender6 f o r  t h e  
award. 
l e e s  ou t r ide  technical  consulting than d i d  lower firms.2 
t o  t h e  author 's  quert ionnaires  only 16 per cent of t he  winners used tech- 
n i c a l  writers t o  improve t h e i r  proposals whereas 36 per cent  of t he  losers 
Furthermore, h i s  study showed t h a t  higher ranking companiee used 
' Among respondents 
r e r o r t r d  t o  thio form of supe r f i c i a l  competition. 
Table'8. Use of Technical Writers 
Sechnica 1 No Technical Tota l  
Wri t e n  Writ era  Rerponrer 
Winner r 4 2 1  25 
b e e r a  29 S l  80 
Thus, the  data ind ica te  that  companier t h a t  win research and develop- 
ment cont rac ts  possess more prior  contract  and o the r  re levant  technica l  
Thomas J. Allen, "The R&D Proposal Preparation Procesr't 
encing Technical Quality (unpublirhed manurcript, &I*T* Sloan School 
of  Xanagement, July,  1964). p . 8 .  
Pectore Inf lu-  
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experience than their competitors, have prepared more related unsolicited 
proposals, understand and more strongly appreciate the government 'r pro- 
posed programs and technical preferencer, et cetera, at cetera, et cetera! 
What Determines R&D Awards? 
The second question listed at the outret of this paper inquired about 
the key determinants of contract awards in research and development. 
sources Of data pertaining to this question the author has studied 100 
research and development awards made by one NASA and two Department of De- 
fense Fnstal1ations. The NASA center was studied in 1962 at which time 
ten large award8 (ranging from $1 million to $40 million in initial sire) 
were studied by file rcarch and open-ended interviews with technical, ad- 
ministrative, and procurement personnel. These large contracts were inter- 
esting to follow and furnirhed an informative but inconclusive picture of 
what happens in the award of R&D contracts. 
in the study approach: (1) the size of the awards examined necessitated 
a smell yet complex aample; (2) the newness of the agency produced unique- 
ness of procurement techniques and/or policy in almost every aase; (3) the 
emphasis on open-ended interviews led to rich background material and anec- 
dotal evidences but gave only sparse persuasive quantitative results. 
Ao 
Three faults were apparent 
With this background it was decided to solicit cooperation fran var- 
ious Department of Defense organizations, working with contracbeof $100,000 
and more, devoting much attention to the gathering of quantitative eviden- 
ces on the award process. 
to participate in the research and made available their procurement files 
for rtudy and their technical and procurement perronnel for interviews 
Without the completa cooperation of there organirationr, the research re:, 
The first two MID organizations contacted agreed 
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ported i n  t h i s  paper would nbt have been possible. Their  a s s i s t ance  i r  
deeply appreciated although f o r  obvious reason8 t h e i r  anonymity must be 
preserved. 
I n  t h e  first of these i n s t a l l a t i o n s  forty-one competitions were 
etudied t h a t  resu l ted  in awards of research and development con t r ac t s  
ranging from #lOO,OOO, t he  minimum award s i z e  included i n  t h e  study, up 
t o  e ight  mi l l ion  d o l l a r s  i n  s ize .  I n  t h i s  f i r a t  i n e t a l l a t i o n ,  t h e  awards 
were made during the  period from January, 1960, t o  June of 1963. The se- 
cond study i n  another M)D f i e l d  center  covered for ty-nine contract  awards, 
ranging from $ l ~ , ~  t o  i n  this  case $2,000,000 i n  i n i t i a l  s i z e ;  and t h e s e  
.. con t rac t s  were issued i n  the  time period from May, 1962, to  June, 1964, the 
t i m e  t h a t  da ta  gather ing was i n i t i a t e d  on t h i s  l a e t  study. Thus t h e  d a t e  
a r e  drawn from f a i r l y  current  cases, t he  l a t t e r  study r e f l e c t i n g  whatever 
inf luences t h e  HcNamara regime has had on t h e  R&D award process. 
The next f i v e  f igures  describe some of the r e s u l t s  of these s tudies .  
Four of them show data from both Defense Department contracting organiza- 
t ions ,  the evidences from the  f i r s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  a t  t he  top  of the page, 
and Organization two down below. The award s t ruc tures  i n  the  two i n s t a l -  
l a t i ons  studied a r e  compared on the  bas i s  of several  d i f fe ren t  dimensionrr. 
Figure 1 shows the  mearure tha t  is  generally regarded as the  moat impor- 
t an t  determinant of R69 awards, i.e., the  evaluated technical  rank of t he  
competing companies. 
of contracts  awarded as a function of the evaluated technical rank of 
the  individual awerd-winning companiee. In the  first organization, the  
graph indicates  tha t  36 contracts out of the 41 went t o  the highest  tech- 
nically-ranked company. 
n ica l ly ,  and so forth.  
The eurvee a r e  frequency d i s t r ibu t ions  of the number 
Two awards went t o  organizations ranked #two tech- 
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41 of t he  awards went t o  the  highest  technically-ranked organization, 
ha l f  a dozen went to  t h e  second highest  ranked, one went t o  t h e  t h i r d  
highest  ranked. 
accepted notion t h a t  i n  research and development t h e  t echn ica l  evaluat ion 
is t h e  key influence on contract  awards. 
t o  be presented, however, i t  may be wise t o  reserve f i n a l  judgment. 
The technica l  rank data  appear t o  support  t h e  general ly  
With more empir ical  evidence y e t  
It is c l e a r  from Figure 1 tha t  not a l l  awards go t o  t h e  highest  tech- 
nically-ranked company. 
o the r  f ac to r s ,  and coat considerations a r e  suggested immediately. However, 
before  cost  or o ther  influences can a f f e c t  an award, competing companies 
must be qua l i f i ed  a s  technical ly  acceptable. 
of technica l  acceptance evaluations va r i e s  from one government organizat ion 
t o  another. 
of first qual i fying proposals f o r  technica l  accep tab i l i t y  and then examin- 
i n g  the cost proposals of only those firma t h a t  a r e  t echn ica l ly  acceptable.  
The same people who do the technical evaluation determine technical  accept- 
Some of t h e  awards apparently a r e  based upon 
S t r i c t  adherence t o  t h e  use  
The second DOD center examined is committed t o  the  p rac t i ce  
a b i l i t y ,  of course. 
t he  49 awards investigated only  one company was regarded a s  technical ly  accept- 
able.  After each such determination, the award was evident-- i t  e i t he r  went 
t o  t h a t  "acceptable" company or the  job might be cancelled by the  Procure- 
ment Office. Contract award, however, was a precondition fo r  inclusion i n  
the  sample. Therefore, Figure 2 is indicat ing t h a t  i n  16 out of 49 cases,  
t he  only influence on the  award was the technical  assessment. 
there  a r e  19 cases i n  which two companies survived the technical  assessment 
and were regarded a8 technically acceptable. This now giver 35 w a r d s  out 
of 49, about 70 per cent of the awards, i n  which the  procurement o f f i c e r  
might have considerad no more than one o r  two companies. The next 
The chart  of Figure 2 demonstrates tha t  I n  16 cases of 
Going fur ther ,  
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point on the  curve represent8 an addi t iona l  ten casea i n  which three  com- 
panies were l i s t e d  ae  technical ly  acceptable. Thus, a f t e r  t h e  technical  
pc 
0 . 
8 *"t ! a 
1 3 5 7 
NO. OF "TECHNICALLY 
ACCEPTABLE" BIDS 
8 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF ''TECCINXCALLY 
ACCEPTABLE" BIDS 
Figure 2 
evaluation i n  45 out of 49 award cases, be t t e r  than 90 percent, no more 
than three  companies were s t i l l  in the  running f o r  t he  award of the  R6D 
contract .  
evaluation and of the  technical evaluators i n  determining the  award 
rec ip ien t .  
These data demonstrate t he  power of t he  technical  phase of 
Turning now t o  other  poseible influences upon R&D awards, Figure 3 
i l l u s t r a t e 8  what happens when the  award winners a r e  ranked on t h e  b a s i s  
of t h e i r  coot posi t ions,  looking a t  how much each winner bid r e l a t i v e  t o  
h i s  competitors for  t he  award. It is important t o  note tha t  a l l  t he  awards 
were e i t h e r  CPFP, CPIF, cost  reimbursable o r  cos t  sharing i n  sme sense. 
Therefore, i n  no case was there a forme1 incent ive fo r  a low bid,  there  
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w e l l  known t h a t  t h e  t y p i c a l  cost  growth t h a t  occurs i n  cost-plus  con- 
t r a c t i n g  is  s u f f i c i e n t  wholly t o  d i s t o r t  any i n i t i a l  b ids  t h a t  a r e  presented. 
Y e t ,  looking a t  a l l  t h e  proposals i n  organizat ion #I (even those t h a t  were 
not technica l ly  qua l i f i ed )  and a t  t h e  technica l ly  acceptable  proposals in 
organizat ion #2 (cost data  were not kept on f i l e  f o r  those not regarded a s  
t echn ica l ly  acceptable),  t h e  possibly su rp r i s ing  r e s u l t  is t h a t  t h e  l o w  
bidder received more awards than any o ther  bidder.  
for t h e  second group s tudied the  s ix t een  casea were omitted i n  which only 
one company was ranked acceptable. 
t h a t  one company a s  high bidder  o r  l o w  bPdder.) 
. .  
h i s  shows up even though 
(It was not known whether t o  t r e a t  
These r e e u l t r  s t i l l  do not f u l l y  explain t h e  R&D award process. 
i t  has  been shown t h a t  technica l  evaluat ion appears t o  determine many of 
t h e  awards; secondly, cos t  evaluation apparent ly  explains  o the r  awards. 
But  t h e r e  is one catch! A l l  of these  formal evaluations,  of  course,  occur 
a f t e r  proposals have been s o l i c i t e d ,  a f t e r  proposals have been prepared, 
a f t e r  proposals have been received by t h e  government agency. 
do happen even before  these phases. 
proposal s o l i c i t a t i o n ,  preparation, r e c e i p t ,  and evaluat ion is t h a t  t h e  
t echn ica l  i n i t i a t o r  i n  t h e  government agency prepares a procurement reques t  
(PR). 
companies t h a t  he has  i n  mind f o r  doing t h e  job. 
a t  both DOD organizat ions t h e  procurement request forms in t h e  government 
f i l e8  were surveyed ad l led  t o  the r e s u l t s  shown i n  t h e  next f i gu re .  For 
both agencies t h e  p l o t s  show the frequency of awards a s  a funct ion of  t h e  
pos i t i on  of t h e  winning company's name i n  the  list of suggested campaniee 
on t h e  procurement request form, 
F i r s t  
But some th ings  
And one o f  t h e  events t h a t  precedes 
On t h i s  PR he indicates ,  among o ther  things,  a l ist  of suggested 
I n  t h e  research  conducted 
It ohould be noted t h a t  t hese  lists were 
fn 2o r 
. 
1 5 LO 
POSITION ON. PR LISTS 
AWARDS AS FUNCTION OF PR€.FERENCE INDICATOR , 
ON PR LISTS 
Figure 4 
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prepared by t h e  technica l  i n i t i a t o r  of t h e  paocurement s i x  months t o  a 
year  p r i o r  to  the  evaluat ion of proposals. 
s a r i l y  excluded from t h i s  analysis.  (There is  l i t t l e  reason' t o  be l i eve  
t h a t  a company name beginning with '@Atr is more favorable than one s t a r t i n g  
I 
Alphabetical  l ists were neces- 
wi th  "2" f o r  ge t t i ng  government business.) Looking a t  these  non-alphabeti- 
c a l  caeee, a very simple hypothesis i s  proposed; f o e . ,  where a f i rm 's  name 
appear6 on t h e  o r i g i n a l  suggested source l i s t  prepared by t h e  technica l  in -  
i t i a to r  i s  a good indica tor  of the i n i t i a t o r ' s  preferences.  
a s  i s  done i n  Figure 4, t h e  award of R6rD contract8 as a funct ion of l i s t e d  
When one p lo t s ,  
pos i t i on  on t h e  PR form, it appears t h a t  indeed t h e  data  support t h i s  hypo- 
t h e s i s  i n  both DOD organi ta t ions.  
One more s t e p  can be taken with t h i s  PR l i s t i n g s  data. I f  a company 
prefer red  by t h e  technica l  i n i t i a t o r  (and so l isted) d i d  not b i d  ( there  
appear t o  be numerous s l i p s  of t h i s  sort), i t  is obvious t h a t  t h i s  pre- 
f e r r e d  company could not w i n .  Amending the  lists by dropping these  no- 
bidders,  t h e  frequency of awards as a funct ion of t h e  revised pos i t ions  of 
those who were l i s ted  ehd dLd bid produces the sharpercurveo of Figure 5 .  
It seems obvious t h a t  t h e  award ind ica to r s  shown i n  Figures 4 and 5 
are important. 
forms t h a t  precede by six month6 t o  a year t h e  technica l  evaluat ion measures 
shown i n  Figure 1. It is almost always the  government engineer o r  s c i e n t i s t  
who prepares t h e  lists incorporated i n  Figures 4 and 5 who a l s o  prepares 
the technica l  evaluations.  Whatever produces the  technica l  prejudice,  t h e  
f e e l i n g s  of confidence and t r u s t  i n  one p a r t i c u l a r  organizat ion r a t h e r  than 
i n  another, t h a t  Le b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  i n i t i a t o r  a t  t h e  t h e  t h a t  h e  prepares 
t h e  procurement requei t ,  l e e a  t o  r t i c k  with him throughout t h e  e n t i r e  for-  
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It is apparent t h a t  t h e  determinants of awards mal competitive process. 
of research and development cont rac ts  a r e  influencee on the  i n i t i a t o r -  
evaluator  pr ior  t o  t h e  preparation of the  procurement reques ts ,  = dur- 
ing  t h e  periob of t i m e  of forrnal proposal s o l i c i t a t i o n ,  proposal preparea' .  
t i o n ,  and proposal evaluation. The proposal s o l i c i t a t i o n ,  preparat ion,  
and evaluat ion a r e  responses t o  a decis ion by the  technica l  i n i t i a t o r  to  
undertake a set of technica l  ac t e  under cont rac t ,  
genera l ly  en te r s  i n t o  t h a t  s e t  of a c t a  a l ready coramitted, a t  l e a s t  i n  h i s  
own mind, t o  one o r  two campanierr. Other evidences e x i s t ,  pr imeri ly  from 
interviews with t h e  government technical  and procurement s t a f f s ,  t h a t  eup- 
po r t  t h i s  conclusion. 
What a r e  t h e  Benefits  of t he  Presenb System? 
It is c l e a r  t h a t  he 
Given the  conclusions now reached on the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of award 
winners and of t he  award process, it is appropriate  t o  pose more d i r e c t  
quest ions of cos t /benef i t s  comparison. The present R&D procurement system 
fea tu res  t h e  formal e o l i c i t a t i o n  and evaluation of formal proposals from 
indus t ry .  Four possible  benef i t s  of t h i s  approach habe been proposed: (1) 
b e t t e r  technica l  ideas  a r e  obtained by competitive s o l i c i t a t i o n ;  (2) lower 
c o s t s  a r e  secured for  t h e  government; (3) i n  general ,  "objectivity",  re- 
garded a s  tlgoodlt f o r  its own sake, p reva i l s ;  and (4) t h e  system is "demo- 
c ra t i c " ,  open t o  a l l  new caners. Each of these  presumed b e n e f i t s  is 
questiona0le.  
1. It is t r u e  t h a t  some better technica l  idees  a r e  obeained by com- 
p e t i t i v e  s o l i c i t a t i o n .  This is shown by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  seven of t h e  41 
awards i n  t h e  f i r s t '  DOD i n s t a l l a t i o n  went t o  companies not o r i g i n a l l y  re- 
commended by t h e  government technical  i n i t i a t o r .  Only two awards of organ- 
i z a t i o n ~  . #2 went to  non-recoamended firms, and one of these  happened &a 
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response t o  t h e  s t rong personal preferences of a newly-assigned technica l  
evaluator who replaced the  o r ig ina l  i n i t i a t b r .  
awards were made because of unique techAica1 Ideas  proposed by these  winners. 
However, most of t h e  award winners were preferred on technica l  grounds long 
i n  advance of t he  formal phases of t h e  process. 
t h e i r  ideao i s  not a resu l tanc  of t h e  formally competitive aspect  of pro- 
curement. 
number of no-bid decis ions by companies i n i t i a l l y  prefer red  by t h e  t echn ica l  
i n i t i a t o r s  of t he  procurements. 
t h e  b e t t e r  technica l  ideas  were l o s t  t o  t h e  government because t h e  b e t t e r  
f i rms were not responsive t o  large-scale open s o l i c i t a t i o n .  
Cer ta in ly  some of these  
Thus, t h e  obtaining of 
Furthennore, t h e  differences between Figure 4 and 5 r e f l e c t  a 
There is  good l ikel ihood t h a t  a number of 
2. There is no way of evaluating whether o r  not lower b ids  a r e  secured 
by competit ive sol ic i ta t ion.  
hardware, spec i f i ca t ions  f o r  R&D pro jec t s  a r e  cons tan t ly  changing and no 
I n  cont ras t  with procurement of off- the-ehelf  
two procurements (except fo r  p a r a l l e l  s tud ies )  a r e  a l ike .  Therefore, I t  
is impossible t o  compare contract  amount8 obtained by d i f f e r e n t  procure- 
ment methods. 
cu r s  i n  research and development r e l i ance  upon i n i t i a l  b ids  xor on cos t  
growth) is not a convincing measure. 
Furthennore, with the  l a rge  cos t  growth t h a t  t y p i c a l l y  oc- 
Two r e s u l t s  of t h e  s tudies  shed some ins igh t  i n t o  t h e  quest ion of con- 
t r a c t  aos t .  F i r s t ,  t he  evaluation r epor t s  and t h e  intervlews i n  DOD orgen- 
i z a t i o n  81 showed conclusively t h a t  a t  l e a s t  four awards were made beceueC! 
of oost  d i f fe rences  i n  pnopoeals, not because of b e t t e r  technica l  approaches. 
I n  two of these  four  cases ,  the assumed cos t  bene f i t s  turned out t o  have 
been gross ly  misleading, end t h e  government pro jec t  monitors r eg re t t ed  t h e  
awards t o  these  lower bidders. Thur, it is poss ib le  t h a t  lower b id  cos t s  
a r e  obtained occaalonally through compstit tva s o l i c i t a t i o n ,  but t h a t  higher  
f i n a l  aorta often: reoul t .  
I 
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Secondly, an important obeervation is t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l l y  prefer red  
companies, t h a t  l a t e r  become the  higher technica l ly  evaluated companiee, 
a l e o  a r e  most o f t en  the  lower biddere, a s  e h m  by the e a r l i e r  f igure8  
preeented. It has been suggeeted by both government and industry o f f i c i a l 8  
t h a t  t h i e  phenomenon is due t o  the "ineider'e" b e t t e r  underetanding of what 
i e  r e a l l y  wanted by t h e  government, r e s u l t i n g  i n  a lack  of attempt t o  cover 
a l l  poee ib i l i t i ea  i n  his propoeed so lu t ion  approach. 
explanation Fa val id ,  It is t r u e  t h a t  t h e  lower bidders ( a f t e r  t h e  f a c t  of 
Whether o r  not t h i s  
s o l i c i t a t i o n )  a r e  t h e  eame firme t h a t  would have received awards had i n i t i a l  
government i n i t i a t o r  preference8 been followed by a more d i r e c t  form of con- 
t r a c t  award. 
3.  A mejor presumption is t ha t  "objectivity",  viewed by many ae  good 
f o r  i t s  own sake, r e e u l t s  from the widespread s o l i c i t a t i o n ,  formal eval-  
uat ion,  mult i - level  review proceee used cur ren t ly  f o r  R&D procurement. 
That t h i s  argument i e  patent ly  f a l e e  wae demonetrated i n  an e a r l i e r  a r t i c l e  
by t h e  author. 3 M e t  evaluation teame a r e  dominated by one o r  two ind iv i -  
duale,  t h e i r  evaluations a r e  dominated by experiences t h a t  precede t h e  
readings of t h e  propoeals, and the  c o w i t t e e s  appointed t o  review t h e i r  work 
ueual ly  rubber stamp the  e a r l i e r  reporte .  
4. The f i n a l  benef i t  often claimed f o r  t he  preeent procurement syetem 
i e  t h a t  i t  i e  "democratic", permitting new companies t o  break i n t o  t h e  RAD 
cont rac t ing  bueineee. It appears from t h e  evidences already preeented 
t h a t  new companiee aan win awards, but not pr imari ly  because of t h e  formal 
3 
Edward B. Roberts, l'"ow t h e  U.S. Buys Research", In t e rna t iona l  Science and 
Technology, no. 33, Septembar, 1964, pp. 70-77. 
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aspec ts  of t he  competitions. 
a r e  generally known before the  formal phases ge t  underway. 
Figures 4 and 5 show t h a t  t h e  award winners 
The answers 
t o  t h e  f i r s t  question posed i n  t h i s  paper i nd ica t e  t h a t  award winners have 
done extensive p r io r  contact work with t h e  government i n i t i d t o r s .  
t h i s  personal contact route ,  nbt the  responses t o  formal s o l i c i t a t i o n s ,  
t h a t  leads t o  RhD awards f o r  o ld  companies a@ well a s  new. 
It is 
What doee t h e  System Coat? 
Four types of c o s t s  result from the present RhD procurement eystem 
t h a t  might be avoided under an a l t e rna t ive  method. They include: (1) 
absolute  d o l l a r  out lay f o r  proposal preparation and evaluation; ( 8 )  mis- 
a l loca t ion  of  government and industry technica l  s k i l l s ;  (3) added time 
delays i n  t h e  achievement of d e d r e d  R&D r e s u l t s ;  (4) lowering of t he  e t h i -  
c a l  standards of p a r t k i p a n t e  i n  t h e  industry.  
c o s t  aspects  of t h e  government and industry data  presented e a r l i e r  a r e  not  
y e t  avai lable .  
e f f ec t s .  
Complete analys&s of t h e  
Thur, the comnents here w i l l  be l imited t o  f i r s t - o r d e r  
1. Companies expend and t h e  government reimburses through overhead 
allowances l a rge  amounts for  t h e  direct cos t s  of preparing R&D proposals. 
The t o t a l  costs depend w o n  the number of firms 
t h e  number of bidders  is dependent i n  t u r n  on t h e  number s o l i c i t e d  t o  p a r t i -  
c ipa te .  This dependency is shown by Figure 6 as w e l l  a s  by t h e  r e s u l t s  of 
cor re l a t ion  ana lys i s .  I n  t h i s  regard it ahould be noted t h a t  i n  both DOD 
orgmiza t ions  s tudied,  double t h e  number of firms were e o l i c i t e d  than were 
bidding on a contract  and 
4 
The Peareon Product Moment Correlatfbn~ Coeff ic ient  r e l a t i n g  number of 
bidders  t o  number s o l i c i t e d  i n  DOD organizat ion #2 i r  0.53, with  e con- 










o r i g i n a l l y  euggeeted by the  technical  i n i t i a t o r .  Thie high percentage 
. 
of  "addGone" f o r  t h e  eake of competition eeeme an i n t e g r a l  pa r t  of t he  
present  eyetem. It need be remembered t h a t  hardly any of these  "add-one" 
win t h e  contract ,  but they do help increaee t h e  t o t a l  procurement cost .  
2. The preeent eyetem t i e e  up t h e  beet indus t ry  people i n  proposal 
preparat ion e f fo r t e ,  denying t h e i r  e k i l l e  from t h e  cont rac ts  a l ready in -  
house in t h e  competing firm. 
eonnel' a r e  e imilar ly  engaged i n  propoeal evaluat ion formal i t ies ,  ine tead  
The most canpetent government technica l  per- 
of i n  in-houoe government reeearch. 
3.  On the average eix t o  eight months paee from preparat ion of t h e  
i n i t i a l  procurement request form u n t i l  contract  award. The l i f e  of t h e  
t y p i c a l  RbD contract  i e  only one t o  two yeare. Thus, t he  present pro- 
curement procees adde from one-fourth t o  one-half t h e  echeduled durat ion 
t o  the  l i f e  cycle  of RbD contracts  i n  t h e  e i z e  range etudied, i.e., up 
t o  about $1 million. With the award ueuelly going t o  a company iden t i -  
f i a b l e  a t  t he  time of procurement request,  aelrioue doubte a r i e e  ae t o  t h e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of t he  added delay. 
4. The e t h i c a l  etandarde of both i n d u s t r i a l  and government p a r t i -  
c ipante  i n  t h e  R&D procurement a r e  lowered by the  pressure8 of t h e  pre- 
s e n t  eystem. Indue t r i a l  people a r e  pushed t o  i n t en t iona l ly  low b!.d, even 
when they know t h a t  cos te  w i l l  rise order8 of magnitude during cont rac t  
l i f e .  Indue t r i a l  people eee and respond t o  competitive s o l i c i t a t i o n s  t h a t  
they know were prepared by t h e i r  own e t a f f  a8 uneol ic i ted  propoeale month8 
before.  Induetry o f t en  reeponde t o  requeete f o r  propoeale only t o  h e l p  
out  a f r iend  i n  government who i e  eeeking t o  keep t h e  procurement o f f i c e  
happy about the  "campetitiveness" of the procurement. 
on the  other hand, a r e  led t o  devious pract ices  t o  ensure awards t o  com- 
Government people,  
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panies they believe competent t o  carry out  the  R&D tasks.  None of these 
prac t ices  a r e  designed t o  encourage t h e  best  technical  people t o  s t ay  i n  
the  R&D contracting business, on e i t h e r  t he  industry or government s i d e .  
What Alternatives Exist? 
The questions and answers presented i n  t h i s  paper a r e  d i f f i c u l t  to  
evaluate conclusively. 
benef i t s  i s  unresolved. 
velue-laden question. 
Whether or not the  present system provides any r e a l  
Hat expensive these benef i t s  should be i s  a l s o  a 
In  the  opinion of the author the  present R&D pro- 
curement system unnecessarily stresses formal i t ies  of competition, when 
in tense  person-to-person informal competition seems t o  be having the  
g rea t e s t  r e a l  e f fec ts .  Why should so much t i m e ,  cos t ,  and technical  s k i l l s  
be wasted i n  improper emphasis on formal proposal preparation and evalua- 
t ion?  
po l i c i e s  t ha t  should strengthen the  effect iveness  of R&D procurement .5 
These changes appear t o  be most su i t ab le  fo r  R&D projec ts  involving leas  
than $1 mil l ion of contract  funding. 
In  t h i s  f i n a l  sect ion a r e  presented some changes i n  a t t i t u d e s  and 
1. Government technical  i n i t i a t o r s  should be given grea te r  f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  the  form of information-seeking tha t  they may use p r io r  t o  R&D awards. 
Alternate  schemes should be encouraged, a s  appropriate t o  each individual  
procurement, including w i d e r  u se  of limitcd-source s o l i c i t a t i o n s  of t he  
top two or three  technical ly  preferred companies, t he  use of o r a l  proposals, 
laboratory v i s i t s  by government i n i t i a t o r s  Co assess  both f a c i l i t i e s  and 
technical  s t a f f ,  question-answer proposals and any o ther  approach t h a t  
reduces the  red tape and gives the  government evaluator t he  information 
needed fo r  an award decision. 
5The changes were or ig ina l ly  documented i n  the  author 's  a r t i c l e ,  "Improving 
R&D Procurement", The Scanner, Fa l l ,  1965. 
-26 
2. Needless practices of a few government agencies should be weeded 
out. 
lations go to great effort to keep procurement details secret. 
ally one go9ernment installation sends out the RFPs andthen tricks in- 
In an apparent attempt to keep industry on the "outs", some instal- 
Occasion- 
dustry by forwarding the proposals to a second center.for evaluation. 
These practices reflect a mood of warfare between government and industry, 
instead of the cooperative partnership that is needed in pioneering tech- 
nical achievements. 
I 
3. Changes in cost-allowances should be considered that will en- 
courage contractors to shift much of the present relatively unproductive 
proposal budgets into more advanced in-house R&D, and into support of 
extended technical publication and communication programs on the companies ' 
progress in research studies. In line with such a shift, it is probably 
advisable to disoourage sometimes irreeponsible "blind"-bidding practices 
by companies that only add to the government evaluators' burdens. Cost 
allowmces for proposals might be restricted to "acceptable" bidders or 
to the top few companies, or a eliding scale of cost 'reimbursements might 
be based on the technical evaluators' rankings. 
4. To further improve the communication between government and 
industry of technical requirements and technical progress, some of the 
time released by reduction of proposal preparation and evaluation work- 
loads should be invested in more frequent symposia sponsored cooperatively 
by the several agencies working in each technical field for exchanges with 
interested contractors. 
will not oucceed, however, unless companies feel confident that signifi- 
cant ideas might readily be recognized by unheritant awards of sole-eource 
Contracts. 
Such stress upon idea and progress communication 
- 27 
5. Finally, the accomplishment of this more open, more responsible 
approach to research and development contracting demends that government 
technical initiators and evaluators include more of the best peo9le;in 
each technical field. In order to accomplish this,,programs of job en-. 
largement need be undertaken in government to attract and hold the most 
competent scientists, engineers, and technical administrat6re. More 
expiicit recognition of statua, combined with higher salaries, particularly 
for the R&D program aunagers in both civilian and military categorles, is 
urgently needed. 
